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Abstract
We examine if the Nordic power market, Nord Pool, has been compet-
itive or if electricity suppliers have had market power. Specically, since
the evolution from national markets to a multi-national and largely dereg-
ulated power market has taken place stepwise, we also examine how the
degree of market power has evolved during this integration process. The
Bresnahan-Lau method together with weekly data during 1996-2004 are
used in the analysis, which shows that electricity suppliers have had small,
but statistically signicant, market power, but that the market power has
been reduced as the Nord Pool area has expanded.
JEL classication: C32; D43; L13.
Keywords: Bresnahan-Lau Method; Conjectural Variation; Electricity
Market; Market Power; Nord Pool.
 The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee, Jörgen Hellström, Mark Taylor and
seminar participants at Umeå University for helpful comments and suggestions as well as for
nancial support from the JC Kempe Memorial Foundation and Sparbankernas Forskningss-
tiftelser. The usual disclaimer applies.
y E-mail: mikael.bask@hanken.
z E-mail: jens.lundgren@econ.umu.se
x Corresponding author. E-mail: nru@du.se
1
Page 1 of 15
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
1 Introduction
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have cooperated during several years
to provide their citizens with an e¢ cient and reliable electricity source. In fact,
all of them have reformed their electricity sectors and have today access to a
common power market consisting of two parts: (i) bilateral trade of contracts
between operators; and (ii) the non-mandatory power exchange, Nord Pool.
Because of these reforms, it is natural to ask whether they have been success-
ful: has the common power market been competitive or have electricity suppliers
had market power? Moreover, since there was a stepwise evolution from national
markets to a multi-national and largely deregulated power market, we also ask
how the degree of market power has evolved during this integration process?
A straightforward measure of a markets competitiveness is the price-marginal
cost markup since it is zero at a perfectly competitive market, meaning that the
electricity price should equal the production cost of the marginal unit of elec-
tricity. However, even though market prices are easily accessible in the Nordic
power market, this is not the case with marginal costs and some other method
must be used to measure the degree of market power. One such method is a
conjectural variation method named the Bresnahan [7]-Lau [19] method.1
The conjectural variation elasticity at the industry level is the average of
the individual rmsconjectural variation elasticities, which measure the rms
output response to the single rms output change as conjectured by this rm.
Thus, if there is perfect competition, there is no output response since a single
rm cannot a¤ect output at the industry level, whereas the response is one-to-
one if there is no competition since the industry behaves as a single rm.
The conjectural variation elasticity is estimated from a two-equation system,
where the rst equation is electricity demand as a function of electricity price
and at least one exogenous variable, whereas the second equation is electricity
supply, derived from prot maximization, which is electricity price as a function
of industry output, the same exogenous variables as in electricity demand and
maybe some other exogenous variables.
The exogenous variables are introduced to solve an identication problem.
Bresnahan [7] solved this problem by using a rotation variable in the demand
equation, whereas Lau [19] showed that the identication of market power is
possible as long as demand is non-separable in at least one exogenous variable.
Thus, if at least one exogenous variable is part of an interaction term in the
demand equation, the identication problem is solved since the interaction term
acts as a rotation variable and it is also non-separable in the exogenous variable.2
Hjalmarsson [15] and Vassilopoulos [24] are the only studies that we are
aware of that measure the degree of market power in the Nord Pool area, and
they nd that the power market has been competitive. However, none of them
studies the e¤ect of market expansion on the degree of market power, meaning
that the present paper lls a gap in the literature.
1 Examples of studies that use this method, or some variant of it, include Aiginger et al.
[1], Alexander [2], Azzam and Park [6], Böckem [8], Hyde and Perlo¤ [16], and Sha¤er [21].
2 The Bresnahan-Lau method has been criticized by Corts [10], who shows that the esti-
mated conjectural variation elasticity measures the marginal, and not the average, collusive
behavior in an industry. However, by using direct measures of marginal costs to calculate the
truevalue of the conduct parameter, Clay and Troesken [9] and Genesove and Mullin [13]
show that the method preforms well when the degree of market power is not too high. Thus,
since Nord Pool consists of over 100 rms, the method is appropriate to use.
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The rest of this paper is outlined as follows: The Bresnahan-Lau method or
model is presented in Section 2, Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, and
Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion.
2 The Bresnahan-Lau model
2.1 The static model
The Bresnahan-Lau model is a static model since there are no lagged or lead
values of the variables included. Specically, the electricity demand function is
Q = D (P;Z;) + "; (1)
where Q is quantity demanded, P is price of power, Z is a vector of exogenous
variables,  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and " is a random term.
Moreover, the electricity supply relation is
P = c (Q;W ;)  h (Q;Z;) + ; (2)
where W is a vector of exogenous variables,  is a vector of parameters to be
estimated,  is the degree of market power, and  is a random term.
c () in (2) is the marginal cost of producing electricity, meaning that when
 = 0, the price of power is equal to the marginal cost and we have a perfectly
competitive power market since all suppliers of electricity are price-takers. How-
ever, when suppliers are price-setters, the marginal revenue as perceived by the
single supplier is equal to the marginal cost, and this is because P + h () is the
marginal revenue at the industry level and  is the perceived percentage of this
revenue. Thus, when  = 1, we have a perfect cartel in the power market.
Then, by assuming a linear demand function for electricity,
Q = 0 + PP + ZZ + PZPZ + "; (3)
including an interaction term between P and Z that acts as a rotation variable,
and a linear marginal cost function,
c () = 0 + QQ+ WW; (4)
the electricity supply relation is
P = 0 + QQ+ WW    

Q
P + PZZ

| {z }
=Q
+ : (5)
Thus, if we rst estimate (3), meaning that we can calculate Q, we can identify
the degree of market power, , after having estimated (5).
2.2 The dynamic model
Steen and Salvanes [23] argue that a dynamic reformulation of the Bresnahan-
Lau model into an error-correcting framework is necessary for two reasons. The
rst reason is that this framework allows for short-run deviations from long-run
3
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equilibrium in data, and the second reason is that this framework solves the
inference problem when using non-stationary data.
Start by writing the electricity demand function as an autoregressive dis-
tributed lag model:
Qt = P;0Pt + P;1Pt 1 + Z;0Zt + Z;1Zt 1 + (6)
PZ;0PZt + PZ;1PZt 1 + Q;1Qt 1 + "t;
and continue by writing the electricity supply relation as an autoregressive dis-
tributed lag model:
Pt = Q;0Qt + Q;1Qt 1 + W;0Wt + W;1Wt 1 + (7)
0Q

t + 1Q

t 1 + P;1Pt 1 + t;
where the long-run stationary equilibrium is found by setting Qt = Qt 1, Pt =
Pt 1, Zt = Zt 1, PZt = PZt 1, Wt = Wt 1 and Qt = Q

t 1. Thereafter, if
we relax the restriction of one lag and include an intercept term, (6)-(7) can be
written in error-correcting forms:
Qt = 0 +
k 1X
i=1
Q;iQt i +
k 1X
i=0
P;iPt i + (8)
k 1X
i=0
Z;iZt i +
k 1X
i=0
PZ;iPZt i +


Qt k   

P

 Pt k   

Z

 Zt k   

PZ

 PZt k

+ "t;
and
Pt = 0 +
k 1X
i=1
P;iPt i +
k 1X
i=0
Q;iQt i + (9)
k 1X
i=0
W;iWt i +
k 1X
i=0
iQ

t i +
 

Pt k  
Q
 
Qt k   

W
 
Wt k   

 
Qt k

+ t:
See Steen and Salvanes [23] for a derivation and a discussion of the relationship
between the distributed lag model and its error-correcting form.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data set
The data set consists of weekly data from all Nord Pool participants, covering
the period from week 1 in 1996 to week 16 in 2004. See Table 1 for the dates
in the integration process, and Table 2 for the variables used, their denitions
and data sources.
[Tables 1-2 about here.]
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The price variable is Nord Pools spot price at the system level (P). Further,
since the industry sector is the largest consumer of electricity, we include indus-
trial production (Prod) when studying electricity demand. A problem, however,
is that data are available only on a monthly basis, whereas all other variables
are available on a weekly basis. There are two options at hand: (i) to exclude
this variable (Vassilopoulos [24]); or (ii) to interpolate data into weekly esti-
mates (Hjalmarsson [15]). We choose to interpolate since the variation of this
important variable within each month is expected to be small.
Two other variables a¤ecting electricity demand are the temperature (Temp),
which is a proxy for the amount of electricity needed for heating, and the length
of a day (Daylength), which is a proxy for the amount of electricity needed for
lightning. We also need at least one interaction variable to be able to identify
the degree of market power. For this reason, we let the spot price at the system
level to interact with the temperature as well as the length of a day in the Nord
Pool area (P*Temp and P*Daylength).
To determine electricity supply, we need to approximate the marginal cost
function and also nd variables that shift this function. For this reason, we look
at the opportunity cost of hydro generation, and two factors that a¤ect this
cost are inow of water to reservoirs (Inow) and how full they already are. We
choose the inow variable as a shift variable.
The Nordic power market consists of a relatively large amount of hydro gen-
eration, which is a cheap electricity source and has almost no variable costs
(Andersson and Bergman [5]), meaning that hydro power is a base load elec-
tricity. When more energy is needed, more expensive sources such as thermal
power are used, and this residual electricity is produced with a number of inputs
such as bio fuel, coal, gas, and oil.
Contrary to hydro power, the technology of residual electricity has higher
and more variable costs (Green and Newbery [14]). Therefore, we incorporate
the coal price (Coal) and the Brent crude oil price (Oil) into electricity supply
to account for the thermal part of electricity generation. Moreover, to account
for the residual electricity trend, we include residual electricity in relation to
total electricity production (Resel) as a variable in the analysis.
Finally, the increase in electricity traded at Nord Pools spot market is an
exogenous trend that need to be taken into consideration when building the
empirical model. Following Hjalmarsson [15], this is accomplished by regress-
ing the system turnover (Turnover) on the market share (Market share) and,
thereafter, use the residual as a detrended quantity variable (Q).
See Table 3 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical
analysis in the di¤erent subperiods in the integration process.
[Table 3 about here.]
3.2 Statistical tests
Before specifying the two-equation regression model, we need to test if the vari-
ables are stationary. If this is not the case, we also need to test for cointegration
to ensure the existence of a long-run equilibrium in data. Finally, a separability
test is preformed on the interaction variables to make sure that the degree of
market power is identiable (Lao [19]).
5
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Dickey-Fullers augmented unit root test is used in companion with the AIC
to test if the variables are stationary. However, a potential problem is that the
variables are highly seasonal, meaning that we have to deseasonalize data before
using the test. This is accomplished by introducing weekly dummy variables and
estimate the following equation:
yt = 0 +
52X
i=2
iWeeki + y^t; (10)
where y^t is the regression residual, which is the deseasonalized value of yt. See
Table A.1 in the Appendix for results.
Thereafter, we use the Johansen [18] approach to search for cointegrated
relations between the variables. Specically, we use the Johansen and Juselius
[17] multivariate cointegration test, which is a maximum likelihood test on the
results from a vector autoregression. As above, a potential problem is that the
variables are highly seasonal, meaning that deseasonalized data are used in the
tests. See Tables A.2-A.3 in the Appendix for results, which show that we have
cointegrated relationships among the integrated variables, both at the demand
and supply sides of the power market.
Finally, electricity demand must be non-separable in at least one of the in-
teraction variables, and the appropriate test is an extension of the cointegration
test by introducing restrictions that the interaction variables are zero. The
restricted model is, thereafter, compared to the unrestricted model using a like-
lihood ratio test. See Table A.2 in the Appendix for results, which show that
the interaction variables should be included in the regression model.
3.3 Estimation results
The demand function and the supply relation for electricity are
Qtj = 0 +
kX
i=1
Q;iQt i +
kX
i=0
Prod;iProdt i + (11)
kX
i=0
Temp;iTempt i +
kX
i=0
Daylength;iDaylengtht i +
lX
j=1
kX
i=0
CVj ;iCVj;t 1 + "t;
and
4Ptmj = 0 +
qX
m=1
kX
i=1
Pm;i4Pm;t i +
kX
i=0
Q;iQt i + (12)
kX
i=0
Q2;iQ
2
t i +
kX
i=0
iQ

t i +
kX
i=0
Inflow;iInflowt i +
kX
i=0
Coal;iCoalt 1 +
kX
i=0
Oil;iOilt 1 +
kX
i=0
Resel;iReselt i +
lX
j=1
CVjCVt 1 + t;
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where fCV glj=1 are cointegrated vectors. Because of a simultaneity problem
that arises in demand and supply models, two-stage least squares is used in the
analysis. In (11), the rst lag of the system price, the temperature, and the in-
ow of water to reservoirs are used as instruments, and in (12), the temperature
and the length of a day are used as instruments. Both equations are estimated
using autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
First, (11) is estimated for the whole period using ve lags. Insignicant
variables are, thereafter, removed from the regression equation and a parsi-
monious model is derived. See Table A.4 in the Appendix for results for the
whole period and for each subperiod in the integration process, which show that
lagged quantities have a positive impact on electricity demand. The estimates
for the cointegrating vectors show that the current price has a negative impact
on electricity demand. Moreover, increased temperature and longer days cause
electricity demand to fall.
Second, (12) is estimated including Q = QQ=P in the regression equation.
Since the price variables are non-stationary, an error-correction model is used
to estimate electricity supply, and as the error-correction term, we use the rst
lag of the cointegrating vector. Electricity supply is estimated for the whole
period, and a parsimonious model is derived as above, which is estimated for
each subperiod in the integration process. See Table A.5 in the Appendix for
results, which show that the inow of water to reservoirs has a negative impact
on electricity price, while the use of residual electricity has a positive impact
on this price. The error-correction term indicates a slow error-correction in line
with previous literature (Hjalmarsson [15] and Vassilopoulos [24]).
Finally, estimates of the degree of market power, , are found in Table 4.3
[Table 4 about here.]
The results show that electricity suppliers have had a small, but statistically
signicant, degree of market power during the whole period, even though it has
been reduced as the market has expanded. In the last subperiod, there was no
market power in the Nordic power market. In economic terms, the estimated
market powers indicate small markups over marginal costs. In fact, the implied
Lerner index gives a markup of less than one percent in the di¤erent subperiods
and an even smaller markup for the whole period.4
4 Discussion
The aim of this paper has been to examine how the degree of market power has
changed as the Nordic power market has evolved from national markets to a
multi-national market. While previous studies have not found any evidence of
market power in the Nord Pool area (Hjalmarsson [15] and Vassilopoulos [24]),
our study, which use a more comprehensive data set, indicate that there has
been a small, but statistically signicant, degree of market power during almost
the whole period. More importantly, our results show that the degree of market
power has been reduced as the market has expanded.
3  2 [0; 1] in Table 4. However, since no minus sign is included in the regression equation,
 changes sign. Therefore, in Table A.5,  2 [ 1; 0].
4 The implied Lerner index is dened as P MC
P
=  
"
, where " is the demand elasticity
(Steen [22]).
7
Page 7 of 15
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
However, the implied Lerner index gives a markup of less than one percent
over marginal cost, meaning that the impact of market power on the electricity
price has not been that severe. Steen [22] examined the Norwegian market with
results similar to ours and concluded that the results are probably more a word
of warning that we should be careful to allow more concentration in this market.
Most likely, there are several reasons why the markup has been low, one of them
being the threat of entry.
Wolfram [25] argues that there are two reasons why rms in the UK have
not utilized all potential market power: (i) the threat of market interventions
from the authorities; and (ii) the threat of entry into the market. Although her
results may not be directly transferable to the Nordic power market, Edin [11]
argues that it is possible that the threat of entry has kept the price close to
marginal cost also in the Nordic market.
Moreover, Amundsen and Bergman [3] analyze the e¤ect of cross-ownerships
in the electricity market and how mergers will a¤ect this market. They conclude
that mergers and cross-ownerships may re-establish at least part of the market
power that the deregulation has removed.
Finally, Amundsen and Bergman [4] compare the Nordic power market to
the Californian power market and nd that the Nordic market has worked well.
This is because the Nordic market is characterized by a simple but sound mar-
ket design, successful dilution of market power, strong political support for a
market-based electricity system, and voluntary informal commitment to public
service by the power industry.
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Table 1: Integration process at the Nordic power market
Country Date for a¢ liation Date for complete integration
Norway January 1, 1993 January 1, 1993
Sweden January 1, 1996 January 1, 1996
Finland December 29, 1997 March 1, 1999
Western Denmark July 1, 1999 March 1, 2002
Eastern Denmark October 1, 2000 March 1, 2002
Table 2: Variables, denitions and data sources
Variable Denition and data source
P Nord Pools spot price at the system level, NOK/MWh.
Source: Nord Pool ASA
Prod Weighted average of the countriesindustrial production
indexes using the countriesGDP shares as weights.
Sources: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway,
Statistics Sweden and OECD
Temp Weighted average of the participating countries average
temperatures, where the weights are the countriesGDP
shares, and the participating countriesaverage temperatures,
in turn, are weighted averages of the average temperatures
in selected cities, where the weights are the cities
populations.a Sources: Nord Pool ASA and SMHI
Daylength Number of hours the sun is above the horizon in Gothenburg,
Sweden. Source: www.stjarnhimlen.se
Inow Inow to water reservoirs, recalculated from water inow to
the waters energy content in MWh.
Sources: Nord Pool ASA and SYKE
Coal Price of coal used to generate electricity, USD/MWh.
Source: The McCloskey Group
Oil Price of Brent crude oil used to generate electricity,
USD/MWh.
Source: tonto.eia.doe.gov/oog/ftparea/wogirs/xls/psw14.xls
Resel Residual electricity traded at Nord Pools spot market in
relation to total electricity production. Source: Nord Pool ASA
Turnover Number of MWh traded at Nord Pools spot market.
Source: Nord Pool ASA
Market share The market share of Nord Pools spot market measured as
the turnover at the spot market in relation to total electricity
production. Source: Nord Pool ASA
Q Detrended turnover at Nord Pools spot market measured by
regressing the turnover at the spot market on its market
share, where the residuals are used as detrended turnover.
Source: Nord Pool ASA
Note: a The cities in Denmark are Copenhagen and Billund; the cities in Finland are Helsinki
and Ivalo; the cities in Norway are Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Tromsø; and the cities in
Sweden are Stockholm, Gothenburg, Luleå and Östersund.
10
Page 10 of 15
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable 9601  0416 9601  9908 9909  0209 0210  0416
P 178:17 181:06 135:08 234:85
(85:45) (79:09) (44:50) (103:07)
Prod 96:21 90:96 98:51 100:72
(8:09) (6:68) (7:48) (6:46)
Temp 6:83 5:95 7:61 7:05
(7:46) (7:56) (6:96) (7:91)
Daylength 86:06 85:25 86:41 86:76
(26:99) (27:23) (27:23) (26:51)
Inow 3:66E + 06 3:43E + 06 4:24E + 06 3:20E + 06
(2:98E + 06) (2:92E + 06) (3:02E + 06) (2:92E + 06)
Coal 37:91 39:93 34:73 39:43
(8:17) (5:60) (4:40) (12:85)
Oil 90:31 74:55 95:44 106:35
(21:85) (18:70) (20:25) (10:23)
Resel 0:11 0:08 0:11 0:16
(0:05) (0:04) (0:02) (0:04)
Turnover 1:66E + 06 9:31E + 05 1:86E + 06 2:43E + 06
(7:43E + 05) (2:44E + 05) (4:56E + 05) (5:73E + 05)
Market share 0:25 0:17 0:26 0:34
(0:07) (0:03) (0:03) (0:04)
Q 0:00  3:63E + 05 8:37E + 05  6:47E + 05
(3:22E + 05) (2:79E + 05) (3:25E + 05) (3:52E + 05)
P*Temp 1:00E + 04 984:86 901:88 1:16E + 04
(1:49E + 04) (1:62E + 04) (985:65) (1:85E + 04)
P*Daylength 1:46E + 05 1:51E + 05 1:13E + 05 1:86E + 05
(7:25E + 04) (8:63E + 04) (4:82E + 04) (5:44E + 04)
Number of 432 164 157 111
observations
Note: 9601-0416 refers to the period week 1, 1996, to week 16, 2004, etc.
Table 4: Degree of market power
Variable 9601  0416 9601  9908 9909  0209 0210  0416
Q* 6:97E   05 5:56E   04 2:02E   04  7:58E   04
(1:47E   05) (2:38E   04) (5:26E   05) (2:06E   03)
Note: 9601-0416 refers to the period week 1, 1996, to week 16, 2004, etc. * Signicant at the
1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
Variable I(0) Lags I(1) Lags
P  2:73 7  9:10 6
Prod  2:94 9  11:82 8
Temp  6:05 7    
Inow  7:50 2    
Coal  1:85 14  3:49 13
Oil 0:24 6  10:57 5
Resel  3:20 5  9:13 4
Q  3:21 8    
P*Temp  4:18 9    
P*Daylength  2:45 3  11:82 2
Note: * Signicant at the 1% level. The critical values are from Fuller [12].
Table A.2: Multivariate cointegration test of the demand function
Demand functionb 95% critical value
0 cointegration vector 71:69 29:70
r = 0
1 cointegration vectors 30:04 15:40
r  1
2 cointegration vectors 5:93 3:76
r  2
Standardized eigenvectors
Variable P Prod P*Daylength
CV1 1:00 0  0:01
CV2 1:00 853:46 0
Separability tests
H0 : 1;P = 2;P = 0 28:17

H0 : 2;Prod = 0 30:18

H0 : 1;PDaylength = 0 26:32

Note: b k=4 number of lags, n=428 number of observations. * Signicant at the 1% level,
** signicant at the 5% level, *** signicant at the 10% level. The critical values are from
Osterwald-Lenum [20].
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Table A.3: Multivariate cointegration test of the supply relation
Supply relationc 95% critical value
0 cointegration vector 31:30 29:70
r = 0
1 cointegration vectors 16:23 15:40
r  1
2 cointegration vectors 6:21 3:76
r  2
Standardized eigenvectors
Variable P Oil Resel
CV1 1:00  1:69  110:93
CV2 1:00  51:07  2:36E + 05
Note: c k=2 number of lags, n=430 number of observations. * Signicant at the 1% level, **
signicant at the 5% level. The critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum [20].
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Table A.4: Estimation results of the demand function
Variable 9601  0416 9601  9908 9909  0209 0210  0416
Constant 4:60E + 05 3:43E + 05 7:25E + 05 4:95E + 05
(9:41E + 05) (1:28E + 05) (1:53E + 05) (2:36E + 05)
Q(-1) 0:78 0:90 0:52 0:67
(0:04) (0:03) (0:05) (0:11)
Temp  4:65E + 04  962:25  1:17E + 05  5:29E + 04
(1:85E + 04) (1:41E + 04) (2:51E + 04) (4:09E + 04)
Daylength  3:21E + 04  1:58E + 04  4:97E + 04  4:67E + 04
(495:68) (443:86) (788:63) (1:21E + 04)
CV1  712:57  291:97  1:01E + 04  889:17
(189:48) (174:23) (417:72) (188:69)
CV2  151:34  208:56  211:05  46:80
(73:48) (100:24) (103:96) (183:89)
R2 0:91 0:96 0:95 0:81
Long-run parameters
Constant 2:10E + 06
(5:24E + 05)
Temp  2:12E + 05
(6:53E + 04)
Daylength  1:46E + 05
(3:40E + 04)
CV1  3:25E + 04
(1:20E + 04)
CV2  689:73
(352:57)
Estimates of the individual components in CV1 and CV2
P1  3:25E + 04
P2  689:73
PD 325:00
Prod  5:89E + 05
Note: 9601-0416 refers to the period week 1, 1996, to week 16, 2004, etc. * Signicant at the
1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level, *** signicant at the 10% level.
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Table A.5: Estimation results of the supply relation
Variable 9601  0416 9601  9908 9909  0209 0210  0416
Constant 4:12 4:89 1:08 5:01
(1:48) (2:56) (2:13) (3:99)
Q 4:75E   05 1:99E   05 3:02E   05 1:96E   04
(2:49E   05) (2:93E   05) (2:57E   05) (1:01E   04)
Q*  6:97E   05  5:56E   04  2:02E   04 7:58E   04
(1:47E   05) (2:38E   04) (5:26E   05) (0:00)
Inow  9:28E   07  1:04E   06  8:99E   07  2:08E   07
(3:11E   07) (4:53E   07) (4:44E   07) (7:40E   07)
Resel 763:98 441:57 639:07 1:57E + 04
(288:12) (278:24) (173:88) (686:12)
CV1(-1)  0:06  0:04  0:07  0:10
(0:04) (0:02) (0:03) (0:08)
R2 0:16 0:15 0:18 0:28
Estimates of the individual components in CV1(-1)
P(-1)  0:06
Oil(-1) 0:10
Resel(-1) 6:66
Note: 9601-0416 refers to the period week 1, 1996, to week 16, 2004, etc. * Signicant at the
1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level, *** signicant at the 10% level.
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